Introduction
The expansion of federal jurisdiction to drug crimes has raised concerns among legal scholars, because federal penalties are in general more severe than state penalties. The difference in penalties hinders state sovereignty and fairness (Newbern [2000] and Clymer [1997] ). As with any other public good, if states differ in preferences or in the cost of prosecution, then absent externalities or cost savings, drug offenders should be prosecuted by local jurisdictions [Oates, 1972] . It has further been suggested that federalization has been guided by the ambitions of federal prosecutors instead of the public's interest. For instance, Glaeser et al. [2000] provide evidence that defendants are more likely to be prosecuted in federal court when these prosecutions are personally beneficial to an assistant U.S. attorney. This paper considers the federalization of drug prosecution as a response to the negative externalities caused by the manufacturing, importation, transportation and use of drugs.
The nature of the externality and its importance in explaining the federalization of the drug war are discussed below. Externalities can be local or national. Local externalities refer to the effect of actions in one locality on outcomes in nearby localities. Local externalities can arise from drug trafficking; for instance, drug trafficking in the inner cities may lead to more drug use and less drug trafficking in the neighboring suburbs.
National externalities refer to the effects of actions in a locality on outcomes in the entire nation. National externalities may arise due to the nature of production, distribution, and transportation of drugs. For instance, Appalachia grows two-fifths of the nation's supply of marijuana, and exports much of it to the Northeast (Clines [2000] ), while in the early 1980s, the Lower East Side of New York City supplied heroin for the Northeast (Raab [1984] ). A further source of national externalities results from fixed costs of establishing drug importation and distribution networks. Hence, widespread use of drugs leads to complex networks that lower the average price of purchasing drugs everywhere in the United States. 1 Alternatively, given a fixed level of prosecutorial resources, more drug sales lead to a decrease in the ratio of seizures to quantity of cocaine produced and thus a reduced price of drugs (Rydell and Everingham This last source of externality makes widespread use of drugs in a state costly to the entire nation.
National externalities may also arise due to the nature of preferences for drug control in a population. In 1996, 82% of Americans thought that illegal drug use was a "big problem" for society, although only 27% saw it as a "big problem" in their own local community.
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Further, 72% of the population saw drug use as "changing the national character," with 50% believing it represents a "fundamental breakdown in the country's morals." Finally, the largest share of the public strongly supported more severe penalties for the possession and sale of drugs. Thus, current dug policies can be explained by the presence of other citizens' drug use in individual Americans' utility functions. This, in turn, can be modelled as a national negative externality in drug use.
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The federalization of drug prosecutions is not explained by local externalities, because local externalities in drug offenses are just as likely to be negative as positive. Presumably, increases in the likelihood of being prosecuted in one locality lead traffickers to move to an adjacent area with a lower likelihood of prosecution. Voters are unlikely to agree to use federal resources to reduce the drug trafficking problems in inner cities if this leads the traffickers to move their operations to the suburbs. In general, as shown in Helsley and Strange [forthcoming] , it is difficult to justify the federalization of criminal prosecution with the existence of local externalities.
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The federalization of drug prosecution is explained by the existence of national externalities in drug offenses. Lack of eradications and less patrolling of highways create negative externalities for the entire nation. Yet, it is not in the best interest of localities along the production, importation, and distribution networks to take into account the national externalities of drug prosecution.
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Thus national negative externalities explain why the federal government should have a greater role in drug prosecutions along points of importation.
Further, national externalities explain why wealthier states with well functioning criminal justice systems can find it more beneficial to spend resources to reduce drug trafficking outside their state than to spend additional resources in their own state. For instance, West Virginia does not have full-time state prosecutors (Committee on Government Operations [1994] ). Thus a large percentage of drug prosecutions in that state are conducted by federal prosecutors.
Decentralized decisions on the resources to spend in combating drug offenses is also inefficient if states disagree on the importance of limiting drug use. According to Blandon and Young [1998] , Americans worry about illicit drugs because of their linkage to high rates of crime, their negative effect on national character and morality, and the harmful health consequences of drugs for communities and individuals. These concerns are likely to vary across states, and states that are not as concerned about drug use are less likely to strictly enforce drug laws despite the negative effect this has on other states.
The manner in which federal drug expenditures are allocated provides further indirect evidence that negative national externalities explain the federalization of drug trafficking. In several instances, drug control by the federal government requires matching state contributions. For instance, the federal government gives Byrne grants that require matching state funding. Further, the federal government assists local authorities in using federal forfeiture statutes, and organizes drug trafficking around federal/state task forces that require state and local commitment of resources (see Blumenson and Nilsen [1998] , 21 U.S.C. §1706).
According to Fiscal Federalism, matching grants should be used when the provision of the 5 Qunitanilla [1997] discusses the removal from office of a District Attorney in Kansas who drained local resources by convicting drug traffickers along the interstate. public good benefits other jurisdictions, with the magnitude of the matching share increasing in the extent of the spillover [Oates, 1999] . Hence, the requirement of matching funds is consistent with the government intervening efficiently and drug trafficking generating national externalities.
A model formalizes the intuition provided in this introduction. In particular it is shown that a higher fraction of drug prosecutions are federal in districts where individuals are not strongly opposed to drug use.
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This paper provides empirical evidence consistent with this conclusion. In particular, it is shown that in districts where a higher fraction of adults favor de-criminalization of marijuana, a higher fraction of individuals convicted to prison terms for drug offenses are convicted in the federal courts. Further, a higher fraction of drug imprisonments are federal in poorer districts and districts that are points of importation.
This paper extends the literature on the role of the federal government. Externalities in drug use lead federal policies to offset local policies. These results stand in contrast to Scholz et al. [1991] , Knight [2002] and Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee [2002] . Scholz et al. [1991] find that counties with Democratic members of Congress have a higher level of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) enforcement. Knight [2002] provides evidence consistent with the federal government giving more highway grants to states who value highways more.
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Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee [2002] find that states with more diverse preferences about liquor policies are less likely to restrict county liquor laws. These differences can be explained by the nature of the externalities. Poor drug trafficking control is more likely to affect the rest of the nation than poor occupational standards, bad state highways, or lax liquor policies. 6 A district is a subdivision of a state. The U.S. states are divided into 90 districts. Hence, on average, a state is split into two districts.
7 Unobserved preferences for highway spending explain the observed positive relation between federal and state highway spending. One can infer this result by noting that when the author instruments for federal spending, increases in federal spending lead to reduced state expenditures on highway construction.
8 Externalities may still exist in occupational standards, state highways, and liquor policies. For instance, [Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee, 2002, page 6] assume that there are positive externalities in uniformity of liquor laws.
Section 2 examines theoretically the relation between states' preferences for drug control and the number of drug convictions. Section 3 analyzes empirically the relation between states' preferences for drug control and convictions. The Appendix includes sources and tables.
Model
A game relates the degree of federalization of drug prosecutions to district preferences for drug trafficking. In this section, a district refers to a state or a local jurisdiction. In the game the players are the national government and the governments of each district. In the first stage of the game, the national and district governments learn the preferences for drug prosecution in each district. In the second stage, the federal government selects a matching rule for each district. In the third stage, district officials select the level of for use and prosecution differ. However, it will be seen in the empirical section of this paper that differences in preferences for prosecution and use are difficult to identify. Finally, the decisions made in a district are modelled as minimizing the welfare losses from drug use and enforcement expenditures, l d .
It is assumed that
Equation (1) states that the number of drug users is decreasing in the number of drug convictions and individuals' distaste for drug use, while increasing in the national availability of drugs. Clearly, the relation between convictions and drug use cannot be linear for the entire range of parameters; hence, the model is to viewed as holding only for the relevant range of the variables. The national negative externalities in drug consumption are δp. As discussed in the introduction, drug externalities take many forms and here we choose to focus on the national negative externalities of drug use.
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Equation (2) states that losses from drug trafficking are increasing in drug use, distaste for drug use, and state expenditures on drug convictions.
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The matching rule selected by the national government is denoted x(t). Finally, the number of federal convictions is
Suppose that districts with high levels of drug use have particularly detrimental effects 9 To model national externalities in preferences, assume that:
This model leads to the same conclusions as the model examined in the paper. 10 The weight given to drug use, t, is going to be a function of the preferences of voters in the district. The exact weighting can be given by a voting model. Alternatively, one can assume that the district authorities want to maximize expenditures on drug prosecutions, but are more successful at achieving their goals in districts where voters are unfavorably predisposed towards drug use. Note that the loss function for the district does not account for the cost of federal prosecutions. Let C f be the fraction of the U.S. population convicted by federal prosecutors for drug offenses. Let be the fraction of U.S. tax revenue paid by the district. Then, the results in the district remain qualitatively the same if we assume that the loss function is Proof Since
By the first order conditions, the state government selects c d in such a way that
Since the federal government seeks to keep drug use at p, c f = 0 if
Then,
It follows that
and x is decreasing in t. Further,
is decreasing in t and
the fraction of drug convictions that are federal is decreasing in t.
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Similarly, since
It can thus be seen that the number of state convictions can be increasing and decreasing in t. However,
Hence, the number of federal convictions is decreasing in t.
The model presented in Section 2 leads to testable hypotheses. Specifically, the model suggests that the number of federal convictions is a function of the parameter t, which denotes individuals' preferences for drug enforcement. Unfortunately, there are no measures of preferences for drug enforcement available at the district level. However, information on several characteristics which should influence preferences for drug enforcement exists in survey data. One can use the survey data to estimate the association between various population characteristics and attitudes towards illicit drugs. The estimates can then be used to predict drug preferences as a function of population characteristics in each district.
Survey data on whether marijuana should be de-criminalized is used to proxy for district preferences for drug policy. Specifically, the survey data is used to estimate the following model:
where the characteristics of an individual include age and religious affiliation. The function F estimated in Equation (3) is used to compute:
where district characteristics include the fraction of the population in a district of a particular age group and religious affiliation. Note that high values of t correspond to a low fraction of the population favoring de-criminalization of marijuana. 
The first regression is likely to yield the most robust results, since dividing by the total number of convictions accounts for some of the unobserved district characteristics. Formally, let x be the observed independent variables and w the unobserved independent variables. Suppose the unobserved variables affect federal and state convictions multiplicatively:
does not depend on the unobserved independent variables.
The remaining control variables in the drug conviction regressions account for factors discussed below. As discussed in the introduction, one expects more federal prosecutions in low per-capita income and border districts. Political factors may also lead the federal government to redistribute income from states that have few senators per capita to states that have many senators per capita (i.e., to less populated states).
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This suggests that less populated states receive a greater per capita share of federal expenditures on drug enforcement. Finally, Boylan [forthcoming] has shown that districts with a more experienced U.S. attorney have more federal convictions.
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Hence, one expects a higher percentage of drug conviction to be federal in districts with more experienced U.S. attorneys.
12 See Atlas et al. [1995] . The effect of Senate representation depends on whether the unit of analysis is the congressional district versus a state and the type of government expenditures (Levitt and Snyder [1995] , Lee [1998] ).
13 The U.S. attorney is the chief federal prosecutor in a district.
There are several natural control variables that are not included in the regressions. For instance, one may expect a higher number of federal drug convictions in districts with more federal and fewer state prosecutors. The reason for not including these variables is that they are the dependent variables in the model. The number of federal drug convictions is a proxy for all federal drug expenditures, which includes the number of federal prosecutors.
Data
The survey data was collected by the National Opinion Research Center's General Social Survey. Since 1975, the General Social Survey has collected public opinion data on individual's view towards the legalization of marijuana as well as information about the individual's race, religion, political affiliation, and conservatism.
14 To estimate preferences for drug enforcement, the following variables are used. The political affiliation of a state is measured by the political affiliation of members of the state house and the state senate. To estimate the effects of district preferences on drug enforcement, the number of federal drug imprisonments are obtained from the Administrative office of U.S. courts. Because the data is only available aggregated at the federal judicial district, for all regressions the unit of observation is a district.
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The study focuses on imprisonments because this is the 14 Individuals were asked their opinion on the legalization of marijuana in the following years: 1983-84, 1986-91, 1993-94, 1996, 1998, 2000. 15 The data set was compiled by Carl Klarner, "Measurement of Further, drug deaths are likely to be more highly correlated with heavy drug than high school use. This is important because heavy users account for the larger fraction of national drug consumption and hence for the national drug externalities considered in this study. For instance, heavy drug users account for 70% of the reported cocaine consumed [Everingham et al., 1995, page 309] . Nonetheless, with both proxies, the empirical estimates are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. the Administrative office of U.S. courts provides the data at the county level. In Section 3.4, the regressions are re-estimated at the county level for this restricted number of years. 17 Causes of death are reported on death certification by physicians, medical examiners, or coroners. This information is forwarded to the National Center for Health Statistics who codes the information according to the rules of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). The ninth edition of the ICD (ICD-9) was used from 1979 to 1998. More details on the data are found in Boylan and Ho [2003] .
18 A justification for the choice of these districts follows. According to Office of National Drug Control Policy [2000] , heroin is imported through the states of New York, New Jersey, Florida, California, Arizona, and Texas.
Estimates of regional preferences
A model of preferences for drug enforcement is estimated using the responses to the following question from the National Opinion Research Center's General Social Survey:
Some people think the use of marijuana should be made legal. Other people think marijuana use should not be made legal. Which do you favor? Table 1 describes the characteristics of the sample. Protestants are split into Baptists, other Protestant denominations (Methodists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and Lutherans), and non-denominational Protestants (the rest). In Table 2 Using the data from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service [1999] and The Bureau of Justice Statistics [1997] , the five cities with this highest weighted number of immigrants are: Miami (1412), Los Angeles (520), New York (496), Houston (432), Chicago (168).
For these reasons 'Border district' is taken to be all district that border with Mexico, New York City, Los Angeles, and Miami.
statistics for the data are provided in Table 3 . In Regression (2) in Table 2 , the independent variable is whether an individual reports to have ever used marijuana, cocaine, heroin, or hallucinogens. In Regression (3) the response is whether the individual reports to have used marijuana, cocaine, heroin, or hallucinogens at least four times in the last 30 days.
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The same individual characteristics explain opinion towards legalization of marijuana, occasional and heavy drug use.
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The estimates of Regression (1) in Table 2 are used to estimate the percentage of individuals who favor the legalization of marijuana in each year and district.
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The sources for the data on the fraction of the population of a political affiliation, race, and religion and the average level of conservatism are listed in Table 4 . 
Results
In estimating the determinants of drug use, the unit of observation is the federal judicial district during a year. The years analyzed are 1983 through 1999. Table 6 provides sum-19 Except for the population size, the coding of the variables is consistent across survey. For the General Social Survey, population size is the size of the place the survey is administered is 1000s. For the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse 1982, −5 denotes the individual resides in a rural area, −4 in a village, −3 in suburbs, −2 in a town, −1 in a city. For the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse 1990 and 1995, −5 denotes an area not in an SMSA and in a rural area, −4 not in an SMSA and not in a rural area, −3 fewer than 250, 000 person in the SMSA, −2 between 250,000 and 999,999 in the SMSA, −1 more than one million inhabitants in the SMSA.
20 The exceptions are the following. Individuals between 25 and 44 are less likely to favor the legalization of marijuana and be heavy drug users compared to 18 to 25 year olds, but more likely to have used drugs at least once in their life. Individuals with four or more years of college education are more likely to favor decriminalization of marijuana, more likely to have used drugs, but less likely to be heavy users. Blacks are less likely to favor legalization of marijuana and have ever used drugs, but more likely to be heavy users.
21 The set of variables used to estimate preferences for legalization of marijuana are very similar to set used in Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee [2002] to estimate the preferences for permitting the sale of liquor.
22 The state liberalism measure is re-scaled because its range is 0 (most conservative) to 100 (most liberal), while the General Social Survey conservatism measure ranges from 1 (most liberal) to 7 (most conservative). Similarly, the population density variable is re-scaled to match the range of the population size variable in the General Social Survey. mary statistics for the district and state variables. Table 7 contains the regression of percent drug imprisonments that are federal, drug deaths, high school drug use, federal and state imprisonments on state preferences and controls. The regressions adjust for the serial correlation in the errors by estimating a first-order autoregressive model with year fixed-effects.
Unobserved heterogeneity among districts is accounted for by district-level random effects.
It can be seen that in districts that are more tolerant of drug use, a higher percentage of drug convictions are federal. The estimated coefficients imply that a one standard deviation in the proportion of the population that favors the legalization of marijuana increases the percentage of convictions that are federal by 15%. Further, consistent with the results in the model, the number of drug deaths is higher in districts that are more tolerant of drug use (Regression 2). In Regression (3), the dependent variable is the fraction of high school seniors who have used an illicit drug. As predicted, in districts with a higher fraction of the population favoring the legalization of marijuana, a higher percentage of high school seniors have used an illegal drug. The coefficient for 'Public opinion' in Regressions (4) and (5) imply that districts more tolerant of drug use have more federal and fewer state convictions, although the coefficients are not statistically significant.
A key variable that is not included in the model of drug prosecutions and drug preferences is an individual's income. Since 1972, the General Social Survey has not changed the coding of income, so that in 1998, 63.5% of responders reported that their income was in the interval '$25,000 or over;' thus the coarseness of the variables makes it of little use. In the regressions in Table 7 , the variable 'Income per capita' is thus likely to capture both redistribution of income (from wealthier states to poorer states) and the fact that higher income individuals are more likely to use drugs (see Grossman and Chaloupka [1998] ). Hence, consistent with the redistribution of income, districts with higher income per capita have more state imprisonments and fewer federal imprisonments. Consistent with drugs being a normal good, higher-per-capita-income districts have more drug deaths.
Consistent with political theories on the distribution of federal expenditures, districts with more senators per capita have a higher percentage of drug imprisonments that are federal. Further, border districts and districts with an experienced U.S. attorney have a higher percentage of drug imprisonments that are federal. Finally, the strong degree autocorrelation (ρ) highlight the importance of accounting for the serial correlation in the data.
Robustness checks
It is possible that the model used to predict preferences for drug enforcement is incorrect.
For this reason, in Table 8 the regressions are re-run using the variables used to estimate drug preferences instead of the variable 'public opinion.' The table includes in parentheses the predicted value of the coefficients for regressions (1)-(4). For instance, according to the model of preferences for drug enforcement, a higher percentage of Democrats in a state increases preferences for drug control. According to the model of optimal federalization of drug enforcement, higher preferences for drug enforcement lead to less federalization, less drug use, and fewer federal drug imprisonments. The predictions for the number of state imprisonments is ambiguous. Hence, the model predicts that the first four coefficients in the row 'Democrat' are negative.
In Regression (1), the dependent variable is the percentage of imprisonments that are federal. The only variables in this regression that are statistically significant are: 'Percentage black' and 'Conservatism.' The sign of both variables is as predicted in the model. Most coefficient in the regressions in Table 8 are statistically insignificant, perhaps because of multicollinearity. [Greene, 2000, page 258] suggests that condition numbers greater than 20 are indicative of a multicollinearity problem. For the regression in Table 8 the condition number is 307, while for the regressions in Table 7 the condition number is 11.6. In Regression (2), the dependent variable is 'Drug Deaths.' 'Democrat,' 'Republican,' 'Catholic,' 'Baptist,' and 'Denominational protestant' are statistically significant and of the predicted sign. The variables 'Less than nine years of education' and 'Unemployment rate' are statistically significant but not of the predicted sign. The wrong sign can be explained by multicollinearity and by drug deaths being related to both drug use and general health conditions.
The effect of the control variables remains unchanged. Specifically, districts with more senators per capita, lower per capita income, border districts, and districts with an experienced U.S. attorney have a higher percentage of drug convictions that are federal. Hence, the re-distributional properties of federalization are robust to functional specification. Further, multicollinearity in the variables used to measure preferences for drug policies suggests that a model be used to rank districts according to their propensity to favor the prosecutions of drug offenders; i.e., a model similar to the one constructed in Section 3.2.
Another concern is that the variable 'Border' may not properly account for the proportion of federal cases that cannot be prosecuted at the state level. For this reason, Regressions (1) in Table 7 is re-run excluding drug trafficking cases that involve import and exports of drugs.
None of the results change. Districts with a higher fractions of (non-import/export) drug imprisonments that are federal are districts where public opinion is more favorable towards decriminalization of marijuana, per capita income is low, senators per capita is high, are points of importation, and have more experienced U.S. attorneys.
The serial correlation in the data was taken into account by assuming an AR(1) error structure. This assumption is very restrictive; in particular it assumes that all districts have the same autoregressive process. The linear regression model with robust standard errors clustered at the district level was estimated to provide estimates that account for arbitrary serial correlation [Wooldridge, 2002, page 152] . The estimates remain unchanged. Namely, districts more prone toward marijuana decriminalization, with more senators per capita, lower per capita income, border districts, and districts with an experienced U.S. attorney have a higher percentage of drug convictions that are federal. Since this estimator is less efficient, the significance level for the variable is decreased and the coefficients for 'Border' and 'U.S. attorney experience' are significant at only the 10% confidence level. Table 7 results in a test statistics of 5.64 (with a corresponding p-value of 0.23 for the χ 2 distribution with four degrees of freedom). Thus, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the unobserved district effects are independent from the explanatory variables.
Since 1996, the number of federal imprisonments is available at the county level from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts. To further test the robustness of the results, for the years 1996 through 1999, the regressions are estimated at the county level. For most counties and years, the number of federal drug incarceration and the number of drug deaths are zero. Specifically, in counties where individuals favor the decriminalization of marijuana, a greater fraction of drug imprisonments are federal, there are more drug deaths, and there are more federal imprisonments (Table 10) .
As discussed in Section 3, per capita income is likely to affect drug use and federal government assistance. Consistent with Fiscal Federalism, in states with higher per capita income, a lower fraction of imprisonments are federal. Further, in counties with higher per AR(1) process. Including the lag of the percentage of imprisonments that are federal does not change the result for Regressions (1) in Table 7 , but makes the coefficient for the variable 'Public opinion' insignificant. However, a common factors test [Greene, 2000, page 552] can be used to show that the restrictions in the coefficients implied by the AR(1) process cannot be rejected at the 10% significant level.
24 Similar results are obtained if the Tobit model is used for all regressions.
capita income, there are more drug deaths and more drug imprisonments. The regressions are re-estimated in Table 11 with the variables that are used to estimate drug preferences. Again, the results are by and large consistent with the predictions in the model of federalization and state preferences.
This study has focused in the federalization of drug crimes. However, similar explanations as the ones provided in this paper can be used to explain the federalization of all crimes.
Suppose the dependent variables is the ratio of all non-drug federal imprisonments over the sum of all non-drug imprisonments. Then, districts with a higher fractions of non-drug imprisonments that are federal are districts with individuals favorably predisposed toward the decriminalization of marijuana, with higher per capita income, with more experiences U.S. attorneys, and in states that are less populated. The effects of public opinion and per capita income are however statistically insignificant. The results are consistent with other crimes not having the same degree of national externalities as drug trafficking.
Conclusion
This study takes an individuals' preferences for drug prosecution as given and examines whether the federal/state mix in convictions is efficient. The model predicts more federal drug trafficking convictions in districts where individuals are not as committed to drug convictions. The federal government thus accounts for the negative externalities not considered in state and local decision-making. The empirical evidence is largely consistent with this prediction.
A large body of literature has suggested that the current level of drug convictions is not cost effective (Becker et al. [2002] , Kuzienko and Levitt [2003] , Miron and Zweibel [1995] ).
The analysis in the paper can be extended to alternative drug strategies. For instance, consider drug treatment policies. If successful, these policies reduce drug use and thus reduce negative externalities in other localities. Alternatively, consider the system where narcotics are legal but taxed. Then, higher taxes and greater efforts to limit tax avoidance lead to lower negative externalities for other localities. Hence, regardless of the drug control strategy, the national government has a role in internalizing these externalities, and the federal role in drug control is greater in localities where individuals are not as opposed to illicit drug use. The numbers correspond to the year fixed-effects for Regression (1) in Table 2 . This is the likelihood that a young, employed, white, independent from the Pacific region with no religious affiliation supports the decriminalization of marijuana. Notes: District random-effects linear model with an AR(1) disturbance. In each regression the unit of observation is the district/year. In Regression (1) the dependent variable is the percentage of drug imprisonments that are federal. In Regression (2) the dependent variable is number of individuals who die from drug abuse and dependency per 1,000,000 inhabitants. In Regression (3) the dependent variable is the fraction of high school seniors who have used an illicit drug. In Regression (4) the dependent variable is the number of federal drug imprisonments per 100,000 inhabitants. In Regression (5) the dependent variable is the number of state and local imprisonment per 100,000 inhabitants. 'Public opinion' is the predicted percentage of the district that favors the de-criminalization of marijuana. The coefficients for the year fixed-effects are omitted from the table. * significant at the 5% level; * * significant at the 1% level; * * * significant at the 0.1% level. Notes: District random-effects linear model with an AR(1) disturbance. In each regression the unit of observation is the district/year. The sign included in parenthesis next to a variable denote the effect of that variable on the likelihood that the individual favors the legalization of marijuana (i.e., the sign of the corresponding coefficient in Regression (1), Table 2 ). The coefficients for the year fixed-effects are omitted from the table. * significant at the 5% level; * * significant at the 1% level; * * * significant at the 0.1% level. 
